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I. INTRODUCTION
A telephone call from Spain to Britain costs twice as much as a
call in the opposite direction,1 and it takes an average of four months
to have a telephone installed in Brussels, Belgium. 2 The average
delivery time of a letter mailed from Italy to Ireland is 5.6 days,
compared with 9.2 days for a letter sent in the opposite direction.3
These examples emphasize the inefficiencies that have resulted from
the lack of competition in both the telecommunications and postal
sectors in most European countries.4 This lack of competition
presents a challenge to the European Community (EC) because
efficient postal and telecommunications services are essential to the
success of the Single European Act. Postal services and telecommuni-
cations account for 3 percent of Community Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and employ more that 2.5 million people.' It is predicted that
"[t]elecommunications alone are set to account for around 6 percent
of the EC's GDP by the year 2000. "6 Furthermore, "[i]t is estimated
that more than half of EC jobs depend on information and communi-
cation technology."7
1. Towards Cost Orientation and the Adjustment of Pricing Structures: Telecommunica-
tions Tariffs in the Community, Annex, SEC(92)1050 final at Exhibit 6 [hereinafter Towards Cost
Orientation].
2. Tim Jackson, Brussels Rings in the Changes, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 23,1992, at 26.
3. Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services,
COM(91)476 final, Table 14, at 90.
4. Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Post and Telecommunications, at the Centre
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (May 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
RAPID File [hereinafter Speech of Sir Leon Brittan]. There are European Community (EC)
member states that do not fit this stereotype. For example, the United Kingdom has liberalized
its telecommunications. See REFERENCE SERVICES, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION,
LONDON, TELEcOMMwNICATIONS SERVICES IN BRITAIN, No. 182/88, at 1 (1988). Britain might
soon deregulate or privatize its post office. See Roland Rudd, A Sale that Promises to Deliver,
FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1992, at 11.
5. Speech of Sir Leon Brittan, supra note 4.
6. Hilary Clarke, Resistance in Europe, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, § III, at 2.
7. Id.
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In Europe, the telecommunications sector developed out of the
postal services.8 Both telecommunications and postal services have
traditionally been controlled by the same institutions, the government
administrations of post, telephone, and telegraph (PTrs).9 Thus, it is
not a coincidence that the same Directorate General"0 in the Commis-
sion of the European Commission (Commission) oversees both
telecommunications and postal services. The cross-subsidization of
funds from the usually profitable telecommunications sector to the
usually unprofitable postal sector provides further evidence of the
bond between the two sectors. Telecommunications and postal
services in Europe have been regulated as natural monopolies 2 and,
for the most part, have not been widely exposed to effective competi-
tion.' The recognition of the importance of efficient telecommu-
nications and postal services to the integration of the EC, however,
have led to a campaign to liberalize these sectors.
The Commission has stated that liberalization in both the
telecommunications and postal services sectors is to be achieved in
accordance with the competition rules provided for under the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty). 4
8. See ELL NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 7-13 (1992). The model for later
European collaboration on telegraphs and telephones began with the creation of a regional postal
union in 1850 that expanded to include telegraphs. See id. at 13.
9. Id. at7.
10. The Directorate General for Telecommunications, Information Industries and
Innovation (DGXIII).
11. In 1988 ten out of the twelve member states' postal administrations (the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands being the exceptions) had a deficit. See Green Paper on the
Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra note 3, Table 3, at 115.
12. A natural monopoly "arises under conditions of pervasive economies of scale or scope,
such that the most efficient way of organizing production in an industry is through a single
integrated firm." PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WI.IAM D. NORHAUS, ECONOMICS 522-25 (12th ed.
1985).
13. Se4 e.g., Telecommunications: What Is at Stake for Europe?, JUSLET=ER BULL., Apr.
1989, at 5 [hereinafter Stakefor Europe] (discussing competition in the telecommunications area).
14. Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications
Sector, 1991 OJ. (C 233) 2, 2 [hereinafter Competition Rules Guidelines]. The competition
policy of the Community is based on Article 3(f) and Articles 85-94. See EEC TREATY arts. 3(f),
85-94. Article 3(t) of the EEC Treaty requires "the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted .... " Id. art. 3(f). Articles 85 and 86 apply
to all companies whether private or public (at least in the telecommunications sector). See Id.
arts. 85-86 (Article 85 applies to restrictive agreements and practices and Article 86 applies to
abuse of a dominant position); Competition Rules Guidelines, supra, at 6. In addition, Article
90 of the EEC Treaty prevents governments from forcing or allowing such companies to infringe
on the rules contained in Articles 85 and 86. EEC TREATY art. 90(1). Thus, if anticompetitive
activities are undertaken voluntarily by a company, the Commission will apply Articles 85 and
86 to prevent such activities. If the anticompetitive activities are imposed on the company by the
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The competition rules allow the Commission to prevent companies
from pursuing voluntary anticompetitive activities. Article 90 of the
EEC Treaty allows the Commission to prevent anticompetitive
activities from being imposed on companies by member states and
Article 90(1) of the EEC Treaty recognizes that member states may
grant special or exclusive rights to public undertakings." Article
90(1), however, also provides that such exclusive rights may be granted
only insofar as these undertakings respect other EEC Treaty rules,
especially those concerning competition. 6  This reinforces the
obligation imposed on member states by Article 5 not to hinder the
achievement of the objectives outlined in the EEC Treaty.'7 Finally,
Article 90(3) enables the Commission to "address appropriate
directives or decisions to member states" in order to ensure that
undertakings falling under Article 90(1) and 90(2) act in conformity
with the EEC Treaty.'8 By introducing directives through Article 90,
the Commission can adopt legislation without the formal consent of
the European Council of Ministers (Council).' 9 This greatly expedites
the directive implementation process, minimizes the degree of
compromise, and removes the uncertainties attendant in the process of
EC legislative enactment. Nevertheless, this use of Article 90 to
address directives to the member states in order to expedite liberaliza-
tion is one of the most controversial uses of the competition rules.'
This Note examines developments in the liberalization of
telecommunications and postal services in the EC and argues that
further policies designed to promote competition need to be intro-
duced. Part II examines the effect of certain directives on telecommu-
nication terminal equipment and services. Part III analyzes the
provisions of the Green Paper for the liberalization of postal services,
state authorities, the Commission will prevent such imposition using Article 90.
15. Id. art. 90(1).
16. Id. art. 90(1)-(2).
17. See id. art. 5.
18. Id. art. 90(3).
19. In contrast to the other articles of the EEC Treaty that enable the Council to enact
implementing legislation (Articles 87 and 94), Article 90(3) specifies that the Commission may
address appropriate directives or decisions to member states. See id arts. 87, 90(3), 94.
20. See generally Leigh Hancher & Piet Jan Slot, Article 90,1 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
35, 35-39 (1990) (discussing the mechanics and complexities of Article 90); Aurelio Pappalardo,
State Measures and Public Undertakings: Article 90 of the EEC Treaty Revisited, 1 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REv. 29, 34-36 (1991) (discussing difficulties and peculiarities in interpreting
Article 90); Koen Platteau, Article 90 EEC Treaty after the Court Judgment in the Telecommunica-
tions Terminal Equipment Case, 3 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 105, 110-12 (1991) (discussing
Article 90 in the context of the Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Case).
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examines the potential effects of the document, briefly examines some
actions of the Commission against postal administrations, and discusses
reforms in the private and public postal services.
H. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The telecommunications sector plays an important role in the
development of the EC economy.2 Technological development,
globalization, and the growing significance of services have spurred the
growth of the telecommunications sector in the EC.' The rapid pace
of technological change in the sector is leading the way for promoting
market growth and productivity throughout the EC economy' Thus,
the telecommunications sector poses an important challenge to the
goal of completion of the single European market. The importance
of the sector in various aspects of human activity, including trade and
social interaction, is evident and likely to increase.
The EC has undertaken a telecommunications deregulation effort
which has been influenced by deregulation elsewhere. Deregulation
of the United States' telecommunications industry in the 1980s begain
global deregulation of telecommunication monopolies.' In addition,
the British initiatives opening the telecommunications sector to
competition set the pace for similar reform in Europe. The telecom-
munications legislation implemented by Britain in 1984 reflected what
the Commission later prescribed for the entire EC in 1987, and the
British approach to controlling telecommunications monopolies became
"a prototype [for] the Community's later liberalisation model."'
Recognizing that developing European telecommunications would
enhance the benefits of the single market and increase the
Community's global competitiveness, the Commission has devoted
considerable attention to the sector.' In fact, the Commission has
estimated that more than half of the jobs in Europe currently depend
21. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
22. Commission of the European Communities, Telecommunications: The New Highways
for the Single European Market, EUR. FILE, Oct. 1988, at 4 [hereinafter New Highways]; Stake
for Europe, supra note 13, at 2.
23. See generally New Highways, supra note 22, at 4-6 (discussing technological
improvements in telecommunications and the implications for the Community economy).
24. Id. at 3.
25. See Hugo Dixon, Freeing the Markets, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1990, § In, at 1.
26. Colin Long, United Kingdom Special Report, in GEaTING THE MESSAGE: A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 73 (INT'L FIN. L. REV. Spec. Supp. 1992).
27. Clarke, supra note 6, at 2.
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on information and communication technology.' It has also been
estimated that by the end of the century, telecommunications will
account for about 7 percent of the GDP of the EC, compared with 3
percent at present.29
Since 1984 when the Community began to design and implement
a European telecommunications policy, Commission initiatives,
legislation, and programs have provided a framework for development
in the sector, yielding guidance to network operators, the manufactur-
ing industry, and telecommunications users.' A key document
setting forth EC telecommunications strategy was the Green Paper on
the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment (Green Paper) published in 1987."' The aim
of the Green Paper was to improve the variety, quality, and cost
efficiency of telecommunications in the EC, thereby strengthening the
telecommunications sector?' The liberalization process includes
opening the markets for terminal equipment and telecommunications
services to competition.33 In order to harmonize the liberalization
process among the member states, the Green Paper introduces the
concept of the Open Network Provision (ONP) which will accelerate
the transition to a competitive EC telecommunications market.'
A. Terminal Equipment
The European market for telecommunications equipment
traditionally has been largely dependent upon the national telecommu-
nications administrations of the member states. These administrations
have monopolized the importation and supply of terminals35 and have
occasionally attempted to bring new technologies into the scope of
administration control. For example, in 1985 the German Bundepost
28. Id.
29. New Highways, supra note 22, at 4-5.
30. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, OFFICIAL DocuMENTS OF
COMMUNrrY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POUCY passim (1991) (reprinting telecommunications
measures published in the Official Journal from 1984 until 1991).
31. See Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final
[hereinafter Green Paper on Telecommunications]. Satellite communications and mobile
telephony are beyond the scope of this Note. EC telecommunications policy treats them as
specific sectors, and each was excluded from the 1987 Green Paper on telecommunications. Id.
32. See id., Summary report, at 3.
33. See id. at 184-86.
34. Id. at 69.
35. See HERBERT UNGERER & NICHOLAS P. COSTELLO, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
EUROPE 194 (1990).
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tried to extend its monopoly to modems.' After intervention by the
Commission pursuant to the EC competition rules, however, the
German government dropped its plans to extend the Bundespost's
monopoly to this area.37 Other member states, including Italy and
Belgium, have attempted to extend the monopolies of their telecom-
munications administrations to modems and telex equipment. 8
1. The Terminal Equipment Directive To ensure the complete
opening of the terminal equipment market in the EC, the Commission
adopted a Terminal Equipment Directive on May 16, 1988 which
requires member states to establish a system of free competition in the
EC market for telecommunications terminal equipment. 9 The
equipment covered includes telephone sets, modems, and telex
terminals.4
The Terminal Equipment Directive requires the abolition of all
special or exclusive rights previously granted to telecommunications
administrations to import, sell, and lease terminal equipment, to
market certain services, and to make connections to the public network
and/or maintain terminal equipment.4' In addition, because the
technical specifications and the procedures through which new terminal
equipment receives governmental approval vary among the members
states, the Terminal Equipment Directive requires the member states
to provide a list of all technical specifications of domestically approved
terminal equipment to the Commission and to publish them4 so that
producers in other member states can adapt their terminal equipment
to the existing telecommunications network. To avoid conflicts of
36. See COMMISSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNIms, FFmENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 205 (1985) [hereinafter FFEENTH REPORT ON COMPEITION POLICY].
37. Id.
38. Id. at 206.
39. Commission Directive 88/301 of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the Markets in
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.. (L 131) 73 [hereinafter Terminal Equipment
Directive]. "Terminal equipment" is defined in Article 1 of the Terminal Equipment Directive.
Id. art. 1.
40. See i., Annex I, at 77. Prior to issuing the Terminal Equipment Directive, which ruled
on the applicability of Articles 30, 37, 59, 60 and 90 of the EEC Treaty on a community-wide
basis and for all terminal equipment products as a group, the Commission had proceeded
successfully against individual member states with respect to specific products-primarily modems
and telex terminals. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrE, SIXTEENTH REPORT
ON COMPETITION POLICY 199-200, points 294-95 (1987); FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY, supra note 36, at 205-06, points 260-61.
41. See Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 39, arts. 2-3.
42. See id. art. 5.
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interest, the Terminal Equipment Directive prohibits telecommunica-
tions operators from serving as both regulatory bodies and commercial
distributors.43 This requirement is designed to prevent telecommuni-
cations authorities from keeping competing products away from the
market. Finally, the Terminal Equipment Directive requires member
states to ensure that their national telecommunications administrations
give their customers the opportunity to terminate leasing or mainte-
nance contracts in order to enable consumers to obtain supplies or
service elsewhere if they wish.'
2. The Terminal Equipment Case The Terminal Equipment
Directive was subsequently the subject of a complaint put forward by
a number of member states in 1988.4s The main concern of the
member states was that they would be excluded from future discus-
sions on the abolition of their national telephone monopolies. In
particular, the French Government, supported by the governments of
Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Germany, challenged the right of the
Commission to issue such a Directive under Article 90(3) of the EEC
Treaty before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 6  These
governments claimed that the matter fell under the legislative powers
of the Council pursuant to Article 100 and was outside the scope of
the Commission's authority.47 In addition, the complaint requested
the annulment of several provisions of the Terminal Equipment Direc-
tive.41
In France v. Commission the ECJ held on March 19, 1991 that
the Commission had the power, under Article 90, to enact a directive
abolishing special and exclusive rights of importation, of commercial-
ization, of link-up servicing, or over the upkeep of terminal equip-
ment.49 The ECJ held that the Commission's duty of surveillance
over expanded undertakings required by Article 90 did not infringe on
the Council's power under Article 100(a).5 The ECJ made it clear
that Article 90(3) conferred on the Commission power to lay down the
43. See id. art. 6.
44. See iU art. 7.
45. See Action Brought on 22 July 1988 by the French Republic against the Commission,
Case 202/88, 1988 OJ. (C 216) 6 [hereinafter Action Brought by French Republic].
46. Case 202188, France v. Commission, slip op. at 6-7 (Court of Justice, Mar. 19, 1991).
47. Id. at 6-7.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 10-12, paras. 19-27.
50. Id. at 12, para. 25 (Article 100(A) gives the Council the authority to enact legislation
harmonizing member states' laws which affect the establishment of the internal market).
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general rules specifying the obligations of member states under the
EEC Treaty with regard to the undertakings referred to in Article
90(1) and (2).51
However, the ECJ annulled Article 2 of the Terminal Equipment
Directive requiring the abolition of "special and exclusive rights." The
ECJ struck down Article 2 on the basis that neither the preamble nor
the operative part of the Terminal Equipment Directive made it clear
what "special and exclusive rights" were envisaged nor how such rights
might be contrary to the EEC Treaty.52 The ECJ also annulled
Article 7 of the Terminal Equipment Directive which would have
required member states to take necessary measures to facilitate the
annulment of long-term terminal equipment contracts subject to
exclusive and special rights.53 The ECJ struck down Article 7
reasoning that Article 90 only confers power on the Commission with
respect to actions of member state governments and not with respect
to purely private corporate contracts.' Thus, Article 7, which did not
refer to government induced contracts, was void. The ECJ also
annulled Article 9 of the Terminal Equipment Directive, which
required member states to provide the Commission with a yearly
report allowing it to monitor compliance with the provisions of the
Directive.55
3. Assessment. The decision of the ECJ in the terminal equip-
ment case (France v. Commission) tested and proved the legitimacy of
the Commission's use of Article 90 to implement the Terminal
Equipment Directive. The ECJ decision confirmed the wide scope of
the Commission's independent legal powers to eliminate distortions to
competition. The implications of that decision can be significant, short
of setting a legal precedent, for future Commission directives
adopted under Article 90.
The propensity in the EC has been toward fully opening the
terminal equipment market to competition.' In spite of the ECJ's
nullification of some provisions, the Terminal Equipment Directive has
51. Id. at 8, para. 14.
52. Id. at 17, para. 45.
53. Id. at 21, para. 56.
54. Id.
55. Id., para. 58.
56. The ECI seeks to achieve consistent judgments, but its precedents are not binding in
the sense that the ECI always remains free to deviate from previous decisions in light of new
factual scenarios. JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 15 (2d ed. 1990).
57. UNGERER & CosuO , supra note 35, at 194.
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succesfully liberalized the terminal equipment market. In 1988 when
the Directive was adopted, there were thirty-five exclusive rights
granted to public telecommunications organizations in the Communi-
ty.58 By the end of 1991 all member states had abolished these
exclusive rights except for Italy, which maintained exclusive rights with
respect to teleprinters. 9 The liberalization of terminal equipment in
the EC has also provided foreign manufacturers with a more accesible
export market.6°
4. Mutual Recognition of Type-Approval Procedure To fully
establish a single market for telecommunications equipment, the
Community has taken steps towards making the member states' laws
concerning mutual recognition identical. In 1986 a directive on the
intial stage of the mutual recognition of type approval for telecommu-
nications equipment was first adopted by the Council.61 The Direc-
tive required the Commission to list international telecommunications
norms and technical specificiations to be standardized.62 According
to the Directive, member states are not to carry out further tests for
a particular type of termial equipment if the results of tests carried out
in other member states are pursuant to "common conformity specifica-
tions."6'
The Council adopted a second directive to further the establish-
ment of an open and unified market in telecommunications terminal
equipment.64 This Directive prescribed a mechanism for mutual
recognition of approval procedures for terminal equipment for the
purposes of marketing such equipment and connecting it to public
networks.6
58. COMMISSION OF TE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT ON
COMPETITION PoLicy 3.I.B. § 1.2 (forthcoming 1992).
59. Id.
60. See Greg O'Connor, EC Develops Plan to Liberalize Its Telecommunications Market,
Bus. AM., Oct. 7, 1991, at 12.
61. Council Directive 86/361 of July 24,1986 on the Initial Stage of the Mutual Recognition
of Type Approval for Telecommunciations Terminal Equipment, 1991 OJ. (L 217) 21.
62. Id. art. 4.
63. Id art. 6.
64. Council Directive 91/263 of April 29, 1991 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual
Recognition of their Conformity, pmbl., 1991 OJ. (L 128) 1, 1.
65. See id. arts. 3-10.
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B. The Telecommunications Services Directive
The majority of EC telephone services is still under the control
of state owned monopolies.6  On June 28, 1990 the Commission
issued the Telecommunications Services Directive67 which was
designed to ensure that member states "withdraw all special or
exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunications services other
than voice telephony. . ." and to allow private operators to supply
such services.' Thus, private companies will be able to offer services
in competition with previously monopolistic suppliers in the EC. The
Telecommunications Services Directive covers "services designed to
improve telecommunications functions . . . information services
providing access to data bases, remote data-processing services,
message storing and forwarding services ... transaction services...
[and] teleaction services .... 69
As with the Terminal Equipment Directive, the Commission chose
Article 90 of the EEC Treaty as a legal basis for the Telecommunica-
tions Services Directive.7" Spain, Belgium, and Italy have challenged
the Commission's right to implement the Telecommunications Services
Directive before the ECJ.71 On November 17, 1992 the ECJ upheld
the right of the Commission to use Article 90(3) of the EEC Treaty to
open the telecommunications market to greater competition.' The
ECJ found that Article 90 did not restrict the authority of the
Commission merely to overseeing how existing Community rules are
applied. Rather, the Commission had a general right under the EEC
Treaty to implement new measures such as those that were challenged.
The fact that such a measure could have been implemented by the
Council did not affect the competence of the Commission to act.73
Moreover, the ECJ stated that the simple act by the Commission of
creating a "dominant position" through the bestowal of "exclusive
66. Clarke, supra note 6, at 2.
67. Commission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the Markets for
Telecommunications Services, 1990 OJ. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter Telecommunications Services
Directive].
68. Id. art. 2.
69. See id. pmbl., para. 6. The Telecommunications Services Directive does "not apply to
telex, mobile radiotelephony, paging and satellite services." Id. art. 1(2).
70. See Action Brought by French Republic, supra note 45, at 6-7.
71. Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain, Belgium and Italy v.
Commission, at 1 (May 20, 1992) (Jacobs, A.G.).
72. Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90, C-289/90, slip op. (Court of Justice, Nov. 17, 1992).
73. See id. at 7, para. 14.
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rights" under Article 90 is not imcompatible with Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty.74
The ECJ did, however, annul two parts of the services legislation.
First, the ECJ canceled all provisions of the Telecommunications
Services Directive as they related to special rights.'5 The ECJ found
that the legal basis for abolishing special rights is not clearly stated in
Article 1 of the Services Directive, which failed to set forth precisely
what type of rights were being targeted and whether the existence of
the rights would breach the provisions of the EEC Treaty.76 Second,
the ECJ annuled Article 8 of the Services Directive, which required
members states to ensure that long-term supply contracts could be
terminated when the Directive came into force 7
The ECY ruling means that private companies should now be able
to offer telecommunications services-such as facsimile, data transmis-
sion, and private networks-which, until now, were offered exclusively
by state-controlled companies.78 The rules upheld by the ECJ,
however, do not cover regular telephone calls (voice telephony).
Nevertheless, the ruling should give the Commission expanded power
and increased confidence to break up other monopolies in the future,
and voice telephony might yet be liberalized.
C. The Open Network Provision
In 1990 the Council adopted a framework directive designed to
harmonize the conditions for access to the telecommunication services
offered by the telecommunication administrations in the member
states.79 The aims of the Open Network Provision Directive (ONP)
are to stimulate the development of nonreserved telecommunications
services and to promote fair competition between the public telecom-
munications administrations and the private service operators.80 The
74. Id. at 12, paras. 33-35.
75. Id. at 11, para. 32.
76. Id., para. 31.
77. Id. at 10, paras. 23-27.
78. Each EC member state (except the United Kingdom) offers "exclusive rights" to a
single telecommunications company. EC Commission's Monopoly-Busting Powers Upheld, Reuter
Bus. Rep., Nov. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AllEur File.
79. Council Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the Internal Market
for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of Open Network Provision, art.
1, 1990 OJ. (L 192) 1, 2 [hereinafter Open Network Provision Directive].
80. Peter Alexiadis, EC Regulation, in GETrnNG THE MESSAGE: A GUIDE TO INTERNA-
nONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 43, 48 (INT'L FIN. L. REv. Special Supp. 1992).
The ONP initially aims to harmonize the following areas: leased lines, packet-switched and circuit-
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provisions of the ONP state that the conditions for access to services
offered by telecommunications administrations in the member states
must be based on objective criteria, must be published and understand-
able, must guarantee equality of access and be nondiscriminatory
within the parameters of Community law, and must not restrict access
to the public telecommunications network and/or public services
"except for reasons based on essential requirements, within the
framework of Community law . . . ."'
Current telecommunications operators have a monopoly over
infrastructure, and they control access to that infrastructure by users
and private service operators. Under the conditions of the ONP,
telecommunications operators will retain their monopolies on the
network infrastructure and on services provided.' However, a series
of directives will require telecommunications administations to offer
access to services across the Community pursuant to the conditions set
forth in the ONP The latest directives and proposed directives
covered under the ONP Directive are discussed below:
1. The ONP and Leased Lines. The term "leased lines" refers to
the telecommunications line systems "provided in the context of the
establishment, development and operation of [a] public telecommuni-
cations network.... ."'" For example, when a telephone call is made
from Paris to Brussels, a telephone line is being leased from a
telecommunications organization for the duration of the call.
Companies which have to make frequent calls to the same subscribers
would find it cheaper to lease by the year instead of by the minute.
The lack of competition in leased lines, however, has resulted in
services that are expensive and inflexible.' For example, leased lines
in Europe cost up to ten times more than they do in the United
switched data services, the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), and related services such
as voice telephony, telex, and access to networks. See Open Network Provision Directive, supra
note 79, Annex I, at 6.
81. Id. art. 3.
82. See Alexiadis, supra note 80, at 48.
83. See Green Paper on Telecommunications, supra note 31, at 69.
84. Council Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1991 on the Application of Open Network Provision
to Leased Lines, art. 2(2), 1992 OJ. (L 165) 27, 29 [hereinafter Leased Lines Directive].
85. Inflexible controls over leased lines include forbidding the connection of leased lines
with public networks, the carrying of third party traffic, and reselling or sharing leased line
capacity. See Mark Newman, Reliability is Crucial Consideration-Telecommunications Services
Analyzed, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 1991, § DI, at 3, 4.
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States.8 In 1987 domestic leased lines in Germany cost up to fifteen
times more than in the United Kingdom.7 Opening leased lines to
competition should reduce charges and cost disparities. In the United
States increased competition has lowered charges for leased lines close
to cost.' In Japan, where the former telecommunications monopoly
NTT has been partially privatized, leased lines now cost two-thirds less
than prior to privatization.'
In June 1992 the Council responded and adopted the first
individual Directive applying the ONP to leased lines.' This Leased
Lines Directive aims to make it easier for companies to lease
telephone lines from public networks across the EC on an open and
nondiscriminatory basis.9' The Leased Lines Directive requires
telecommunications administrations to make leased lines available to
providers of those services which are targeted for competition in the
Telecommunications Services Directive. 2 Services not covered by the
Telecommunications Services Directive, such as mobile telephone
services and satellite services, are not covered by the Leased Line
Directive.'
The Leased Lines Directive requires that conditions and tariffs on
leased lines be published and that the Commission be notified of
any changes to these conditions or tariffs in advance. 5 The Commis-
sion will then publish that information for users.' In order to
guarantee open access for all users, the Leased Lines Directive calls
for member states to harmonize technical standards. 7  Technical
restrictions will not be permitted to impede the process of linking
86. The Fruitf44 Tangled Trees of Knowledge, THE ECONOMIST, June 20, 1992, at 88.
Connection and rental charges for leased lines have generally declined in real terms from 1980
to 1991. Towards Cost Orientation, supra note 1, Annex, at Exhibit 4.
87. Continental Divide, Tim ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1987, at 25. The German Telekom
Infrastructure Council agreed to reduce their leased lines charges by 54 percent. David
Goodhart, "End Soon" for German Telephone Monopoly, FIN. TMEs, Oct. 7, 1991, at 3.
88. Land of the Free, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1987, Survey, at 13.
89. See Steven Butler, The Genies of Privatisation-Profile, Japan's Ministry, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1991, § M, at 6.
90. See Leased Lines Directive, supra note 84.
91. See id. pmbl., para. 17.
92. See id, para. 8.
93. See id. (indicating that member states shall withdraw all special or exclusive rights in
accordance with the Telecommunications Services Directive).
94. Id art. 3.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 3(2).
97. Id. art. 7.
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leased lines together.' Finally, the telecommunications organizations
must use transparent cost accounting systems suitable to "ensure that
tariffs for leased lines follow the basic principles of cost orientation
and transparency."'
The liberalization of leased lines should assist in the growth and
development of value added services. In addition, "[t]he leased line
directive should prove particularly valuable to a number of service
providers such as cellular telephone operators that rely on private
circuits for building their infrastructure."'" Finally, the competitive-
ness of large international companies should also be enhanced. This
is imperative for them because "[t]hey need to integrate the most
advanced technologies into their business networks to stay internation-
ally competitive."''
2. The ONP Directive and Voice Telephony Services. The
deregulation of voice telephone services within the EC is controversial
because "[v]oice telephony is the biggest and most economically
important service operated by telecommunications administrations and
is a vital service for both consumer and business users."'" Voice
telephone services account for about 90 percent of telephone
companies' business.103  Yet the present situation in Europe is
unsatisfactory when compared to that in the United States and
Japan." "A three minute call from Boston to Washington, D.C., a
distance of 650 kilometers, costs one-third of the equivalent distance
call in Europe from Paris to Milan.... Phoning Milan from Brussels,
again the same distance, costs four times as much.""05 In addition,
98. See id. art. 6.
99. Id. art. 10.
100. EC: Telecommunications Ministers Open up Supply ofLeased Lines Within Community,
Reuter Textline Computergram, June 17,1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AllEur File.
101. David Buchan, EC Plan for Telecoms Leasing, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at 4 (citing
the Commission on the advantages of leased line liberalization to international companies).
102. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP)
to Voice Telephony, COM(92)247 final at 6 [hereinafter Proposed Voice Telephony Directive].
103. A Definite Article of Dissen" The EC's New Programme for Reform is Already Looking
Doubtful, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1990, § Ilr, at 3.
104. European Strategy Report Nears Completion, TELECOM MARKETs, June 27, 1991, at
7 (discussing an Arthur D. Little report "Telecommunications Issues and Options 1992-2010",
which argues that some well-developed markets in the United States and Japan such as toll-free
calling, customer calling services, audiotext and direct dial, are "practically nonexistent" in
Europe).
105. Competition: EEC Commissioner Warns Telephone Monopolies, EUR. REP., No. 1741,
Feb. 5, 1992, § III, at 1.
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the prices of identical international calls between member states can
vary considerably depending on the origin of the call. For instance, "a
five minute telephone call made from Dublin to Bonn costs one-third
less to telephone than the call [made] in the opposite direction. ' 16
Installing a telephone is seven times more expensive in Denmark than
in Germany, "while monthly subscription charges in Ireland are almost
four times higher than in Greece . ,,.0" Finally, only three EC
countries use itemized billing, and only two countries have set up
independent bodies to arbitrate disputes between consumers and
telephone companies."°
Consumers and providers alike should benefit from the deregula-
tion of voice telephone services in the EC. Public operators should
profit from an expanding market and receive revenues from private
firms that will lease services from the public networks.' 9 European
companies would also benefit from cheaper long-distance telephone
costs in the EC, new services, and operator choices."' In addition,
consumers would benefit from cheaper long-distance telephone calls
without compromising the cost of local telephone service."'
Public telephone companies argue that to fulfill their public
service duties they need to maintain their monopolies." According
to this argument, the deregulation of telephone services will encourage
preexisting monopolies and new providers of services to confine
themselves to the most lucrative services and to neglect users in
peripheral areas. One solution to this problem is to require providers
of services to comply with certain minimum service requirements
relating to peripheral users."
The Commission has proposed a directive which applies the
principles of the ONP to voice telephone service and networks."4
106. Telephone Services: BEUC Study Shows up Wide Disparities in the EEC, EUR. REP.,
No. 1744, Feb. 15, 1992, § m, at 5.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Telecommunications: Forward Towards Gradual Deregulation of Telephone Services,
EUR. RP., No. 1780, June 27, 1992, § IV, at 14, 15 (predicting market growth of 6-7 percent).
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id. However, the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions (BEUC) argues that the
whole reduction in international charges is more of a benefit to businesses rather than to
consumers, because consumers generally make local calls. See Telephone Services: BEUC Study
Shows up Wide Disparities in the EEC, supra note 106, at 5.
112. Telecoms Regulation: The Last Stand, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 1992, at 65.
113. Telecommunications: Brittan: Seeks to Phase out Telephone Monopolies, EUR. REP., No.
1763, Apr. 25, 1992, § M, at 8.
114. Proposed Voice Telephony Directive, supra note 102, at 6.
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This Proposed Voice Telephony Directive aims to provide for a
minimal harmonization of the quality of telecommunications services
and to define the rights of users of such services. The proposal has
three basic goals. First, it will establish the fights of public telephone
network users when dealing with telecommunications organizations by
setting minimum quality standards to be enforced by member
states." Second, it will expand access to the public telephone
infrastructure for service providers and other telecommunications
operators, including mobile phone services, on a fair and nondiscrimi-
natory basis. 6 Finally, it will enhance community-wide access to
voice telephone services." The means for achieving these goals
would include establishing common technical specifications for such
equipment as sockets and terminals1. and aiming to harmonize
phone numbers on a community-wide basis."9 The Proposed Voice
Telephony Directive is a good step towards improving the quality of
voice telephone services, but is neutral towards deregulation of this
telecommunications subsector.
In October 1992 the Commission launched a review of the
telecommunications services sector.' This review was required by
both the Telecommunications Services Directive, which allowed
monopolies on voice telephony to continue, subject to a reconsidera-
tion by the Commission in 1992, and the ONP Directive, which also
provided for a 1992 progress review.121 From among several options,
ranging from preserving the status quo to completely liberalizing voice
telephone services, the Commission decided to recommend the
introduction of competition for telephone calls between member states
only.m Thus, international calls directed outside of the Community
will remain under monopoly. The Commission's telecommunications
policy of introducing competition gradually m does not fully explain
the reason for the Commission's compromise decision. It is thus
necessary to look at the political factors involved to determine the
reasons behind this policy.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id art. 19.
119. Id art. 20.
120. Commission Launches Review of the Telecommunications Services Sector (Press
Release, IP837) (Oct. 21, 1992).
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id.
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On the Community level the recent Danish rejection and the
narrow approval by the French of the Maastricht Treaty have provided
added incentive for compromise on the part of the Commission.'
Furthermore, voice telephone services are very sensitive politically.
National administrations, particularly in France,' have strongly
opposed deregulation of voice telephone services because of its
importance for revenue generation and the maintenance of universal
service through cross-subsidization. These administrations believe that
Europe will only be able to fight off American and Japanese "infiltra-
tion" of the EC voice telephone market by retaining large monopo-
lies." The concerns of the telecommunications administrations,
however, appear to be overstated. The deregulation of
intracommunity voice telephone services should have a limited impact
on the income of public telecommunications administrations because
calls between Community countries account for only 4 to 5 percent of
their revenues.' 7
Even if the Commission liberalizes only intracommunity voice
telephone services, however, the state monopolies will still feel the
pressure of competition in the area of international calls. United
States discount telephone companies can take advantage of the price
disparities with the EC and offer citizens more competitive rates. One
technique offered by private international telephone companies known
as "ring-back" permits European callers to take advantage of cheaper
one-way telephone rates for calls coming from the United States by
connecting them to a computerized switch in the United States which,
when triggered, automatically calls them back and puts them through
to their American destination.' A second technique, known as
"third-country calling," consists of routing international calls through
the United States to take advantage of lower United States telephone
rates. 9 Inevitably, these tactics should contribute to forcing Euro-
pean telecommunications administrations to lower their charges. 30
124. See Brussels Tamed, THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 29.
125. See id. (noting that France Telecom profits nicely from its monopoly over cross-border
calls from France to other member states).
126. Clarke, supra note 6, at 2.
127. Telecommunications: Telephone Deregulation Under Commission Microscope, EUR.
REP., No. 1774, June 6, 1992, § III, at 6.
128. International Telephone Calls: The Privateers, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 79.
129. I&
130. Some EC countries have recently lowered their transantlatic rates. For example,
France Telecom has cut the price of peak time calls to Asia and America by 18 percent. See
Telecoms Regulation: The Last Stand, supra note 112, at 65. In January 1992, Deutsche Telekom,
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3. Other Initiatives Related to the ONP In June 1992 the Council
adopted a Recommendation for harmonization of a minimum set of
Packet-Switched Data Services (PSDS) in accordance with the
provisions of the ONP' The PSDS calls for the harmonization of
standards, usage conditions, supply conditions, and tariff principles
relating to a minimum set of packet switched public data services. 2
In June 1992 the Council also adopted a Recommendation for
harmonizing access arrangements relating to the Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) that lists a minimum set of ISDN offerings in
accordance with principles set forth in the Open Network Provision
Directive." ISDN is a collection of technical standards which
describe how an advanced network should be arranged.'M ISDN
provides the infrastructure upon which voice, data, text, and simple
video communication can be transmitted on the existing network.135
In July 1992 the Commission proposed a directive with the goals of
establishing a single market in telecommunications services by
establishing a procedure for the mutual recognition of licenses
throughout the Community and of authorizing the provision of
telecommunications services issued by any member states. 36  The
proposal also created a new committee, the Community Telecommuni-
cations Committee, to assist the Commission in the implementation
procedure.7
In order to remain competitive in the EC single market, the
achievement of faster communication methods and easier access to the
the German state telecommunications monopoly, said it would cut transantlatic call charges by
up to 37 percent, and investigate its entire tariff structure. See Quentin Peel, Germany Cuts
Transantlatic Phone Charges, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 17,1992, at 3. Most German telecommunications
services, except basic phone service, were liberalized in 1989. Goodhart, supra note 87, at 3.
131. Council Recommendation 92/382 of 5 June 1992 on the Harmonized Provision of a
Minimum Set of Packet-Switched Data Services (PSDS) in Accordance with Open Network
Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 OJ. (L 200) 1.
132. I& at 2-4.
133. Council Recommendation 921383 of 5 June 1992 on the Provision of Harmonized
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Access Arrangements and a Minimum Set of ISDN
Offerings in Accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 OJ. (L 200) 10
[hereinafter ISDN Recommendation].
134. Buy a Gee-Whizz-O-Ban& Please, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1990, Survey, at 25.
135. ISDN Recommendation, supra note 133, pmbl., para. 6; see Green Paper on
Telecommunications, supra note 31, at 117-18.
136. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Mutual Recognition of Licences
and Other National Authorizations to Operate Telecommunciations Services, Including the
Establishment of a Single Community Telecommunications License and the Setting up of a
Community Telecommunications Committee (CrC), art. 1, COM(92)254 fmal-SYN 438 at 17.
137. Id. arts. 20-21.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL SERVICES
wider European market will increasingly become essential. On the
global scale, the availability of advanced telecommunications services
will help EC companies to remain competitive on world markets. The
challenge will be to achieve a community-wide telecommunications
network which provides better integration and compatibility of
telecommunications equipment and services. This will be crucial for
the competitiveness of the European telecommunications sector and
for the achievement of a common market in goods and services
beyond 1992.
III. POSTAL SERVICES
Postal services are of great importance to the proper functioning
of the internal market of the EC and to the growth of both
intracommunity and international trade." The postal services sector
contributed nearly 1.3 percent of the Community's GDP in 1989 and
presently employs 1.7 million workers. 9 In addition, the mail order
and direct mail industries, which are inextricably linked to the postal
services, contribute 0.8 percent to the Community GDP'4u Thus,
postal services significantly contribute, directly and indirectly, to the
wealth of the Community.
Postal administrations within the member states provide services
in three product areas: letters, express mail, and parcels. For the most
part, the letter services remain subject to the exclusive rights of
domestic postal administrations.141 Private operators mainly engage
in the delivery of parcels and express documents. 42 Such operators
also offer some cross-border letter delivery services,143 which at times
appear to be in contravention of national postal laws.
The performance of the postal services throughout the EC is
highly inconsistent and irregular. Delivery of a letter may take
between a day and a week, which creates a "distortion to the
European market and [is] a serious handicap for businesses and
138. See Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra
note 3, at 29-33.
139. Id. at 1, 31. Currently, the public postal administrations in the EC employ 1.35 million
people, and private operators employ an additional 0.35 million people. Id. at 36.
140. Id. at 31.
141. Id at 75.
142. Id, Table 6, at 74.
143. Id at 75.
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consumers in those countries with poor postal administrations. '
One of the reasons for this inconsistency is that some member state
regulations prevent postal authorities from increasing their prices to
raise enough money to invest in service improvements.14 The lack
of harmonization causes significant problems for mail passing from one
member state to another.' Because of the different measurement
systems used, it is difficult to compare service performance among the
member states. It is apparent, however, that service performance
varies significantly among the member states.147 Capital investment
in postal services and facilities also differs widely throughout the
EC.'" For example, the postal administration networks in Greece
have neither mechanized sorting offices nor automated post offices
compared to 100 percent and 99 percent, respectively, for The
Netherlands. 49 These problems, together with the importance of the
postal sector to the integration of Europe, have motivated the
Commission to take steps towards liberalization which include the
establishment of a uniform postal policy through the introduction of
a green paper for the liberalization of postal services u °
A. The Green Paper for the Liberalization of Postal Services
(Green Paper)
On May 13,1992 the Commission adopted its Green Paper on the
development of the single market for postal services."h The delay
in adopting the Green Paper, which was originally due at the end of
1990,12 resulted from disagreements within the Commission on the
extent to which postal services should be regulated. The final draft is
144. Opening Up the Post, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at 18; see Philip Hastings, Postal
Harmony: Can the Community Deliver?, ACCOUNTANCY., Feb. 1992, at 66.
145. See Hastings, supra note 144, at 66.
146. See Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra
note 3, at 183-84.
147. Id. at 180 (stating that service performance ranges from 15 to 99 percent for national
services).
148. See id. at 155.
149. Id. Results of such investment have been mixed, however, both in terms of cost
reduction and improvement of services. Id. at 137.
150. See generally Opening Up the Post, supra note 144, at 12 (arguing that the Green Paper
is a strong initial step toward privatization, but that more needs to be done).
151. See Postal Services: Green Paper Balances Market and Universal Service Principles,
EUR. REP., No. 1796, May 16, 1992, § III, at 1.
152. Postal Services: Express Operators Voice Qualified Welcome for Draft Green Paper,
EUR. RFP., No. 1738, Jan. 25, 1992, § I, at 10.
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a "compromise between the interests of the private sector operators
and the large state monopolies."'5"
The Green Paper is a "discussion document" which aims to
stimulate detailed discussion with governments, users, operators,
employees, and other interested parties in order to shape policies
which will ensure that all customers throughout the EC receive
satisfactory postal services at affordable prices.' 4 Following this
period of discussion, the Commission will formulate conclusions and
propose the actions deemed necessary to improve postal services.'
If appropriate, the Commission will then draw up draft directives. 6
The Green Paper lists five reasons why the Community should be
concerned with improving the present conditions of the EC postal
services. First, the Green Paper cites the lack of harmonization that
can delay the delivery of mail between member states157 The source
of this problem is that the operations providing universal service in
each member state have evolved independently. 8 Because univer-
sal service is defined differently in different member states, customers
sometimes cannot post similar items in each member state.59
Second, variations in service performance among member state postal
administrations for universal service have significant implications for
the single market. In some member states "next day delivery
performance reaches the generally accepted target of 90 percent .
..."'1 In others, performance is as low as 15 percent.'6' For
cross-border mail, the generally accepted service target is delivery
within three working days.6  Although this target is not very
demanding, performance currently covers only about 40 percent "with
large variations between different postal administrations."' 6 Third,
the Green Paper cites problems with the cross-border services in the
Community. As noted above, service performance currently averages
153. Id.; see also Postal Services: Green Paper Balances Market and Universal Service
Principles, supra note 152, at 1 (reporting the content of the Green Paper).
154. See Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra
note 3, at 29.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 183.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 184.
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only 40 percent of performance goals.'6 Given the increased
importance of cross-border communications, this performance likely
falls short of customer expectations and should be a source of concern
to the Community.1 6 Fourth, the Green Paper lists the wide diver-
gences of reliability existing in the postal sector which disadvantage
individuals and businesses in certain areas of the EC." Finally, the
Green Paper notes the potential for market distortion when the scope
of the exclusive rights is larger than needed to ensure universal
service." These variations adversely impact industries within the
Community that are heavily dependent upon postal services.'6 As
a result, businesses and consumers suffer.169
The Green Paper considers four general options as possible
solutions to the problems and chalienges identified above. These
include: (1) complete liberalization; (2) complete harmonization; (3)
preserving the status quo; or (4) achieving equilibrium between a
further opening of the market and increasing the strength of universal
service." According to the Green Paper, the first option, complete
liberalization, would result in the loss of universal service to all
customers because no private operator would be interested in
providing a standard letter service to all parts of any national
territory.'7' The second option, complete harmonization, would
likely require the establishment of a single postal administration and
the application of a common tariff throughout the EC.72 Such a
reform would cause overwhelming problems. A single postal
administration would likely be unable adequately to address or
respond to unique local conditions within member states when
formulating various policies.' 3 It would also mean costly additional
overhead.'74 Further, the application of a uniform tariff would lead
to massive cross-subsidies because tariffs presently vary by as much as
a factor of three.' The third option, preserving the status quo,
164. Id.
165. Id. at 185.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 234-37.
171. Id. at 234.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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would further widen the gap between already very positions. This
would lead to a "two-speed Europe" in the postal services.176
The Commission has concluded that the fourth option, striking an
equilibrium between opening up the market and strengthening
universal service, would better suit the needs of the Community than
the other three options.' To strengthen universal service for all
customers a set of "reserved services" that confer special and exclusive
rights on national postal administrations would be established.' 8 In
the interest of opening the market, however, the class of reserved
services would be no larger than necessary to meet the universal
service objective. 9
The fourth option provides guidelines which would enable postal
administrations to fulfill their public obligation to provide a good
quality, affordable, and accessible postal service for all citizens and
businesses both within each country and across borders. 8 ° "Re-
served" services could include personal and business correspondence,
but clear limits indicating the precise scope of the reserved area would
be established and defined in terms of weight and price.' The
scope of the area reserved from full competition should vary in
proportion to the need to maintain a particular universal service."r
Other postal services would be outside the reserved area in order to
ensure further free competition. This arrangement should increase
freedom of choice once the universal service objective is achieved.s
If this plan were implemented, a number of services previously offered
only by the post offices could then be offered by other companies from
the public or private sectors. The Green Paper advocates that express
mail and the mailing of publications should be excluded from the
reserved sectors, if they are not already liberalized in member
states.s
176. Id. at 235.
177. Id. at 237.
178. Id. at 234-37. The Green Paper defines "reserved service" as "[a] service the provision
of which is obliged to an operator (in fact always the postal administration, in the case of postal
services) who in turn is granted some special and exclusive rights. These rights almost always
state that this operator has the sole right to provide the services in the territory to which the
reservation applies." Id. at 369.
179. Id.
180. Id at 233, 235-37.
181. Id. at 236.
182. See id.
183. See id at 237.
184. Id at 235.
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The Commission will effect the liberalization of direct mail only
after a detailed economic analysis." Postal monopolies strongly
oppose the liberalization of direct and cross-border mail because these
areas are profitable and expanding,' which benefit the postal
administrations. Direct mail consists of advertising messages sent in
bulk, typically by the publishing, insurance, financial services, and mail-
order industries." Direct mail accounts for approximately 20
percent of all Community postal deliveries" and it is regarded as a
sector with great potential as studies show that the average EC citizen
receives only one-fourth of the direct mail of a citizen of the United
States."9 The Commission plans to liberalize the direct mail sector
because currently the majority of Community postal administrations do
not provide the quality, choice, and value of services that businesses
desire." Allowing competition in the direct mail sector will benefit
companies that are established in poorly served areas as well as
smaller companies that wish to enter new markets, to target new
customers, and to compete against more firmly established brands. 9'
Direct mail also is an effective marketing tool that contributes to
competition and ultimately benefits consumers. Nevertheless, some
postal administrations have reservations about competition in the
profitable direct mail business, not only because it will reduce the
postal administrations' income,"9 but also because of fears that the
liberalization of direct mail will make it difficult to check whether
businesses were actually sending advertising instead of bills and
estimates.93
Cross-border mail accounts for approximately 7 percent of all EC
deliveries in terms of volume 94 and it is another controversial
subsector in the postal liberalization process.95 Postal monopolies
185. Id. at 235-36.
186. See Postal Services: Hopes Raised for Breakthrough on Green Paper, EUR. REP., No.
1758, Apr. 4, 1992, § III, at 5; Postal Services: Monopolies Lobby Hard in Advance of Long-
Awaited Green Paper, EUm. REP., No. 1748, Feb. 29, 1992, § III, at 5-6.
187. Speech of Sir Leon Brittan, supra note 4.
188. Postal Services: Hopes Raised for Breakthrough on Green Paper, supra note 186, at 5.
189. Id
190. Speech of Sir Leon Brittan, supra note 4.
191. Postal Services: Hopes Raised for Breakthrough on Green Paper, supra note 186, at 5.
192. See generally id. (direct mail comprises 20 percent of Community postal deliveries),
193. See ag., French Reserves on Commission Postal Services Green Paper, EUR. REP., No.
1803, Oct. 14, 1992, § III, at 8.
194. See Postal Services: Green Paper Set for Adoption on May 13, EUR. REP., No. 1768,
May 13, 1992, § III, at 1-2.
195. Id.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL SERVICES
fear that their private sector competitors would select and serve the
more lucrative EC city-to-city routes and leave them with less
profitable rural deliveries if ordinary cross-border mail operations were
liberalized. 96 Because only 4 percent of intracommunity postal
services are cross-border,"9 the impact of liberalizing this sector will
not be substantial on a community-wide level. On a national level,
however, certain post offices have more to lose. For example, the
intracommunity mail of Luxembourg and Ireland are approximately 35
percent and 25 percent, respectively. 9' On the other hand,
Germany's intracommunity mail is less than 2 percent.' Therefore,
the financial impact of liberalizing cross-border mail will differ greatly
among the member states.
Remail is a cross-border letter mail service provided by private
companies, usually in conjunction with a postal administration,'
which provides delivery of bulk business mail. 1 The term "remail"
describes the process by which direct mail is collected in one country,
taken to another, placed in the local mail system, and ultimately
distributed in that country, in the country of origin, or in a third
country.1 In a complaint lodged by the International Express
Couriers Conference against the Community postal authorities, remail
operators contested that some postal administrations hinder their
business by agreeing to raise terminal dues and by enforcing provisions
196. Postal Service: Hopes Raised for Breakthrough on Green Paper, supra note 186, at 5.
197. Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra note
3, Table 7, at 275. "7% of letter mail is cross-border traffic, 4% being 'intra-community' and 3%
being 'extra-Community' mail. In revenue terms, the cross-border share is slightly higher-about
10% of letter revenue. For parcels and express services, the cross-border mail is worth about
11% of revenue." Id. at 274.
198. Id., Table 7, at 275.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 369.
201. See Europe's Postal Monopolies: Neither Snow Nor Rain, Nor Fax ... , THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1990, at 83.
202. "There are three different sorts of remail operation. A-B-C remail involves mail being
collected in the country of the customer (A), freighted to a second country (B) where it is posted
into the international mail system for onward transmission to (and delivery in) a third country
(C). A-B-B remail involves collection in the country of the customer (A), freighting to the
country of delivery (B) and delivering to the addressee there (B), usually by posting with the
postal administration there. A-B-A remail involves domestic mail being taken from the country
of the customer (A) to a second country (B) for mailing back to the first country (A)." Green
Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra note 3, at 369.
1992]
228 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:203
of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) Convention which allows them
to obstruct remail.'
To avert the risk of a "two-speed" postal service which would
reduce benefits to customers and businesses of the Single European
Market, the Green Paper aims to improve the level of harmonization
between the member states.' The Green Paper prescribes that
rules of access to the national postal networks should be the same in
each country so that the postal administrations or private operators
wishing to exercise their right to use the networks to provide their
services will not be hindered by regulatory or technical barriers. In
addition, common performance standards for Community postal
services should be set, with the results being published. The Green
Paper also suggests that tariffs should reflect the average cost of each
service.' Finally, the Green Paper states that in order to ensure
impartial treatment of all operators, the body regulating postal services
in each member state should be separate from the service provid-
ers.2
B. Actions by the European Commission Against Postal Service
Monopolies
Private courier companies play an important role in integrating
the European economy.' In order to ensure that such companies
are adequately protected, the Commission has investigated several
complaints concerning postal services and has taken actions under the
EEC Treaty against Governments that have imposed constraints on
private international courier services or considered these services to be
part of their postal administration's reserved area. In 1985 the
Commission discovered that the German Post Office (Bundepost) had
attempted to apply its monopoly rights over the transport of mail to
a whole range of its own services, including its own express service,
Datapost.? Following the Commission's intervention, the
203. Speech by Sir Leon Brittan, supra note 4. Terminal dues are the amount paid by one
postal service administration to another if it sends more international mail than it receives.
Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra note 3, at 370;
Speech by Sir Leon Brittan, supra.
204. See Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, supra
note 3, at 253-54.
205. Id. at 249-50.
206. Id. at 247-48.
207. FIF=ENTH REPORT ON COMPETrION POUCY, supra note 36, at 202.
208. Id.; see also European Commission Decisions, 6 EUR. COMPETnON L. REV. 10 (1985)
(summarizing information from a January 18, 1985 press release on German Data Post).
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Bundepost assured the Commission that it would accept competition
from private courier services and would not charge below cost for
deliveries in order to dominate the market.' The same .year a
similar action was taken against the French post office after private
couriers had been taxed and limited to the Paris area.21 In 1989 the
Italian government was forced to remove its prior constraints on
private courier services which required the private services to put post
office stamps on all packages, even if the Italian post office provided
no actual service 1
In December 1989 the Commission demanded that the govern-
ment of The Netherlands revise a new postal law which obliged all
private courier companies to register domestic and international service
tariffs with the national post office1 and prohibited the couriers
from undercutting the national post office's minimum tariff level.
Responding to an appeal by The Netherlands to the ECI,213 the ECJ
voiced no objection to the substance of the Commission's case, but
ruled against the Commission because it had not followed proper
procedures in applying Article 90 of the EEC Treaty 14 The ECI
held that the Commission had not allowed the Dutch postal monopoly
to defend itself against the allegation that the new Dutch postal law
placed the national post office in a dominant position which it could
abuse at the expense of private express mail operators.
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In August 1990 the Commission issued a decision concerning
Spanish legislation which prohibited all institutions other than the
Spanish post office from collecting, transporting, or distributing letters
and documents weighing under two kilograms.2 16 This legislation
prevented private express international courier services from compet-
209. European Commission Decisions, supra note 208, at 10.
210. FIFrEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 36, at 203.
211. European Commission Decisions, 1 EUR. COMPEITION L. REV. R-10 (1990)
(summarizing information from a September 1,1989 press release on Italian International Courier
Companies).
212. Commission Decision 90/16 of 20 December 1989 Concerning the Provision in the
Netherlands of Express Delivery Services, arts. 1-2,1989 OJ. (L 10) 47,47; COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrTEs, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPmTrlON PoLIcY 201, point 19 (1990).
213. Action Brought on 15 March 1990 by Koninklijke IT Nederland NV and PIT Post
BV against the Commission (Case C-66/90), 1990 OJ. (C 132) 9.
214. Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66190, Netherlands, Koninklijke PIT Nederland NV &
iT Post BV v. Commission, slip op. at 15-18 (Court of Justice, Feb. 12, 1992).
215. Id.
216. Commission Decision 90/456 of 1 August 1990 Concerning the Provision in Spain of
International Express Courier Services, 1990 OJ. (L 233) 19.
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ing in Spain. 7 The Commission alleged that the Spanish post office
had abused its dominant position218 within the meaning of Article 86
because the legislative limits on couriers affected trade between
member states.219 The Commission rejected the arguments of
Spanish post office that their exclusive monopoly over international
express courier services was justified to preserve "the financial
equilibrium of the Post Office."'  The Commission concluded that
the international express courier market was only of "secondary
importance" for the Spanish post office, and therefore there was no
reason that competition should be eliminated. 1 Spain has contested
the Commission's decision in an appeal to the ECJ.m
After receiving a formal complaint from the Commission, the
Danish government undertook legislative changes which removed the
Danish post office's exclusive rights to collect, forward, and deliver
mail and permitted the operation of private courier services.' Thus,
following intervention from the Commission, the governments of
Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and Denmark allowed private
express courier services to compete with the national postal monopo-
lies.'
C. Reforms in the Private and Public Postal Services
The current internationalization and increasing liberalization of
the EC postal services sector has prompted adjustments by some
217. See id.
218. Id at 22. The Post Office holds a dominant position because "it has been granted the
exclusive right to collect, transport and distribute letters and postcards from one place to another,
to install post boxes and issue postage stamps, within the territory of Spain... ." Id. at 21.
219. See id. at 19, 21. The Commission's decision set forth the following principle:
An abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 is committed where
an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself or
to an undertaking belonging to the same group, without any objective necessity, an
ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its
activities on neighboring but separate markets, with the possibility of eliminating all
competition from such an undertaking.
Id. at 21.
220. Id. at 22.
221. See id.
222. Postal Services: EEC Court Backs Dutch Challenge Against EEC Action on Courier
Monopolies, EUR. REP., No. 1744, Feb. 15, 1992, § M, at 2.
223. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIrIES, TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 207, para. 356 (1991).
224. FIFET REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 36, at 202-03. "The
Commission is still discussing the Posts Act of 1983 with the Danish Government, however, as
it also prevents private couriers from providing a remailing service in Denmark." TWENTY-FnST
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 58, at 3.B § 2.2.
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private courier companies and national postal authorities.' For
example, TNT Express Worldwide (TNT) has agreed to create a 50/50
joint venture with GD Net-which consists of national postal organiza-
tions in Germany, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada-in
order to strengthen its position in the European market, 6 This
agreement provides for establishment of an international courier and
express parcel organization offering international express delivery
services.'n TNT expects the undertaking to lead to economies of
scale, to reduce unit costs, and to "provide a solid base for the future
expansion of the Joint Venture."' The Commission's decision to
permit the joint venture subject to certain conditions demonstrates its
determination to introduce competition into the postal and courier
delivery sector.
As there appears to be room for only a small number of global
express transport companies, ' 9 the next few years should see further
examples of postal organizations working with private sector compa-
nies as partners to develop similar integration strategies. The burden
of large and costly infrastructure requirements faced by private express
transport companies seeking to succeed globally but lacking sufficiently
profitable volumes has led to some poor financial results. Federal
Express, the United States postal carrier, appeared to confirm this
assessment through its decision to terminate all intra-European
activities in 1992."50 Unless synergies can be realized by the marriage
of formally competitive forces, some groups may have difficulty in
carving out the large niche required to survive in a competive global
market.
Several of the national European postal services have begun to
prepare for the liberalization of some of their services. Of these postal
services, the British Royal Mail is one of Europe's most efficient and
225. Philip Hastings, Packaged for More Profits, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1992, § rV, at 1.
226. TAT Ltd and Five Post Offices to Join Forces in an International Express and Courier
Organization (TNT Ltd, Press Release) (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter TNT Press Release]; Janina
Walker, Monopoly Likely to End Soon, FIN. TIMES, May 20,1992, § IV, at 2; Catherine Gautier,
La Poste dans la cour des grands, LA POSTE REFARPNCES, May-June 1992, 22, 23.
227. TNT Press Release, supra note 226.
228. Id.
229. Hastings, supra note 226, at 1 (citing John Mullen, chief executive of GD Express
Worldwide, TNT'"s joint venture).
230. Charles Goldsmith, Life after Federal Express: European Couriers Hope for an End to
Price-Cutting, INT'L HERALD TRM., Mar. 19, 1992, Bus./Finance, 1, 14. "Federal Express will
maintain service to and from Europe and the United States but will serve only 16 European cities
directly." Id. at 14.
1992]
232 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:203
profitable postal offices. 1  The British government has indicated
that it will consider breaking up its national post office or selling it as
an entity to a single buyer3 2 The United Kingdom is also studying
a plan to allow private postal operators to bid for licenses to compete
with its national post office in different regions.'
IV CONCLUSION
The exchange of information through the telecommunications and
postal networks is vital to the creation of a single European market.
The liberalization of the two sectors will enable European businesses
to become more efficient and competitive. Nevertheless, there are
potential obstacles which must be overcome if effective liberalization
is to be achieved. Deregulation of postal services could increase prices
in certain member states. In addition, countries like the United
Kingdom which have an efficient and inexpensive postal service would
not want to risk losing the benefits of their existing domestic system.
Thus, liberalization and privatization need to be carefully monitored
and administered so that service improves rather than deteriorates.
One of the most important aspects. of the liberalization of both
telecommunications and postal services is the perceived need to
separate the regulatory and operational functions of the national
administrations. In essence, the Commission seeks to ensure that no
single body serves as both the referee and the player in a competitive
environment. There is also the fear that liberalization will encourage
"cream skimming," in which the private sector concentrates on the
most profitable services, leaving the rest to the existing administra-
tions. A solution to these problems would be to offer direct subsidies
to connect disadvantaged groups on a competitive basis as incentives
for firms to provide the service in question. Another solution is
to require private companies to provide certain services.
The experience gained from the competition policy which has
been implemented in the telecommunications sector of the EC will
influence efforts to liberalize Community postal services. Moreover,
the recent ECI decision upholding the liberalization of telecommunica-
tions services under Article 90 has given the Commision the affirma-
231. Rudd, supra note 4, at 11.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 6 (qualifying that the "licenses plan is the most radical [part of the government's
review] under consideration").
234. Sir Leon Brittan, European Policy on Competition, Address to the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Bonn (June 25, 1992), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Rapid File.
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tion it needed to proceed in liberalization efforts. In continuing to
liberalize the telecommunications sector and commencing liberalization
of postal services, it is critical that a fair balance between liberalization
and harmonization be maintained. The current liberalization effort
appears promising, but much remains to be done if this balance
between liberalization and harmonization is to remain secure. Once
liberalization is achieved, however, the story will be far from over.
Instead, a new chapter will begin where the Commission's role will be
to ensure that competition in these sectors is maintained so that the
benefits from liberalization become truly sustainable.
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